















criminal	 responsibility’,	 which	 outlines	 the	 ‘physical’	 and	 ‘fault’	 elements	 of	 criminal	
offences,	 and	 defines	 concepts	 such	 as	 recklessness.	 This	 paper	 assesses	 the	 MCC	 as	 a	
criminal	law	reform	project	and	explores	questions	of	how	the	MCC	came	into	being,	and	
why	 it	 took	 shape	 in	 certain	ways	at	a	 particular	point	 in	 time.	The	paper	 tackles	 these	
questions	 from	 two	different	 perspectives—‘external’	 and	 ‘internal’	 (looking	 at	 the	MCC	
from	the	‘outside’	and	the	‘inside’).	I	make	two	main	arguments.	First,	I	argue	that,	driven	
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The	 Commonwealth	Model	 Criminal	 Code	 (MCC)	 (Parliamentary	 Counsel’s	 Committee	 2009),	










first	 set	 of	materials	would	 come	 to	 form	 Chapter	 2	 of	 the	MCC,	 titled	 ‘General	 Principles	 of	





project	 in	 Australia’s	 history	 but,	 measured	 in	 terms	 of	 outcomes,	 the	MCC	 has	 not	 been	 as	
significant,	nor	as	successful,	as	its	drafters	had	hoped.	By	modelling	‘best	practice’	in	criminal	
law	(Goode	2004:	234),	the	MCC	aimed	to	bring	Australia’s	nine	criminal	jurisdictions—six	state	
governments,	 two	 territory	 governments	 and	 the	 federal	 government—into	 some	 sort	 of	
alignment.	This	was	no	easy	task:	in	the	Australian	Federation,	most	criminal	law	is	state‐based,	
and	Australia	has	both	common	law	criminal	jurisdictions	(New	South	Wales,	Victoria	and	South	
Australia)	 and,	 as	 a	 result	 of	 earlier	 systematising	 efforts,	 jurisdictions	 with	 criminal	 codes	
(Australian	Capital	Territory,	Northern	Territory,	Queensland,	Tasmania,	and	Western	Australia,	
as	well	as	the	Commonwealth).3	Crucially,	as	I	discuss	in	this	paper,	the	common	law	states	and	
the	 code	 states	 adopt	 different	 approaches	 to	 the	 principles	 of	 criminal	 responsibility.	 The	
drafters	of	the	MCC	attempted	to	resolve	this	issue	once	and	for	all,	and	to	generate	a	centripetal	
force	in	criminal	law	in	Australia.	But,	with	state	jurisdictions	taking	up	the	MCC	provisions	in	a	
piecemeal	 and	 uneven	way,	 it	 has	 not	 been	 thought	 to	 have	 had	 a	 decisive	 influence	 on	 the	
Australian	criminal	law	landscape.	As	I	argue	in	this	paper,	the	significance	of	the	MCC	as	a	law	





these	questions	from	two	perspectives:	 ‘external’	and	 ‘internal’;	 in	other	words,	 looking	at	the	
MCC	from	the	‘outside’	and	the	‘inside’.	I	make	two	main	arguments.	First,	I	argue	that,	driven	by	
a	‘top	down’	law	reform	process,	the	MCC	came	into	being	at	a	time	when	other	changes	in	crime	
and	 criminal	 justice	were	 occurring,	 and	 that	 it	may	 be	understood	 as	 an	 attempt	 to	 achieve	
stability	 in	a	 time	of	change.	Second,	 I	argue	 that	 the	significance	of	 the	principles	of	 criminal	
responsibility,	which	formed	the	central	pivot	of	the	MCC,	lies	in	the	coherence	these	principles	














The	 creation	 of	 the	 MCC	 was	 the	 activity	 of	 an	 intellectual	 elite.	 It	 was	 conceived,	 drafted,	










criminal	 law	 (Goode	 1991a).	 The	 Committee,	 chaired	 by	 the	 Hon.	 Harry	 Gibbs	 (the	 ‘Gibbs	
Committee’),	 produced	 a	 draft	 Bill	 for	 a	 Federal	 criminal	 code	 (Review	 of	 Commonwealth	
Criminal	Law	(Australia)	1990)	but	 this	was	not	 introduced	 into	parliament.	The	work	of	 the	
Gibbs	Committee	inspired	efforts	to	develop	a	criminal	code	for	all	Australian	jurisdictions	and,	
in	1990,	the	Standing	Committee	of	Attorneys‐General	of	Australian	states	and	territories	(SCAG)	
put	 the	development	of	a	uniform	criminal	 code	 for	Australia	on	 its	 agenda	 (Code	Committee	
1992:	 i).	This	move	recognised	 that	a	number	of	Australian	 jurisdictions	were	undertaking	or	
about	to	undertake	reviews	of	their	criminal	law	and,	thus,	that	‘the	time	was	right	to	consider	
moves	towards	at	least	consistency,	if	not	uniformity	in	criminal	law’	(Code	Committee	1992:	ii).	












Committee	1992:	 ii).	The	Committee’s	direct	connections	with	 the	government	of	 the	day—‘it	






















power	 of	 the	 legislature	 (Kayman	 2004:	 214‐216).	 In	Bentham’s	 terms,	 and	 by	 contrast	with	
common	 law	(‘dog	 law’),	written	 (statute)	 law	does	not	 invite	constant	 interpretation	and	re‐
interpretation	(Kayman	2004:	217).	Moreover,	codification	of	 the	 law	had	advantages	beyond	
those	 of	 statute.	 Chief	 among	 these	 is	 recognition	 of	 parliamentary	 sovereignty.	As	Ashworth	
writes,	 the	 enactment	 of	 a	 criminal	 code	 makes	 it	 clear	 that	 ‘the	 creation	 of	 offences	 is	 for	
Parliament	alone,	and	that	the	role	of	the	 judiciary	 is	to	 interpret	rather	than	add	or	subtract’	
(1991:	 420).	 It	 is	 on	 this	 basis	 that	 codes	 are	 held	 to	 serve	 an	 important	 democratic	 and	














































































project	 of	 national	 significance	 and	 unanimously	 gave	 commitments	 to	 fostering	 its	
implementation	 by	 2001	 (Goode	 1997).	 Against	 a	 political	 and	 constitutional	 backdrop	 often	
characterised	 as	 ‘uncooperative	 federalism’,	 the	 MCC	 was	 carried	 by	 the	 momentum	 of	
exceptional	 state‐territory‐Commonwealth	 collaboration,	 receiving	 largely	 positive	 if	 brief	
welcome	across	the	political	spectrum	in	the	Commonwealth	parliament	(Spindler	1994:	352;	
Vanstone	1994:	351).	The	Criminal	Code	Bill	1994	became	the	Criminal	Code	Act	1995	(Cth),	with	
what	was	now	The	Commonwealth	Criminal	Code	 included	as	 a	 Schedule.	At	 this	point,	 it	was	
confidently	anticipated	by	both	politicians	and	many	legal	professionals	that	the	model	offence	













The	 first	 factor	 was	 the	 changing	 reality	 of	 crime.	 When	 discussion	 about	 a	 criminal	 code	
commenced,	the	reality	of	crime	in	Australia	was	perceived	to	be	changing.	Trans‐jurisdictional	
crime,	particularly	drug	crimes	and	organised	crime,	was	impacting	on	the	Australian	criminal	













The	second	 factor	contributing	 to	a	perception	of	change	was	 the	changing	reality	of	 criminal	
justice.	There	were	two	aspects	to	this:	changes	in	relations	between	parts	of	the	criminal	justice	
system;	 and	 the	 changing	 relationship	 between	 state	 and	 Commonwealth	 criminal	 justice	
systems.	With	regard	to	the	first	aspect,	the	last	decades	of	the	twentieth	century	were	a	time	of	
flux.	 The	 size	 of	 criminal	 justice	 systems	 had	 grown	 significantly,	 and	 policing	 practices	 and	
increasing	 prison	 numbers	 were	 prominent	 political	 issues.	 Further,	 both	 the	 states	 and	 the	
Commonwealth	 recognised	 the	escalating	cost	of	 criminal	 justice	as	an	 issue	 (Vanstone	1994:	
351).	In	spruiking	the	MCC,	the	Minister	for	Justice	emphasised	that	 it	would	remove	barriers	











An	 additional	 aspect	 of	 this	 change	 in	 the	 criminal	 justice	 landscape	 related	 to	 the	 evolving	
relationship	between	state	and	Commonwealth	criminal	justice	systems.	In	1901,	at	the	time	of	
Federation,	states	had	retained	power	to	pass	criminal	 laws,	but,	by	the	end	of	 the	1980s,	 the	
scope	of	Commonwealth	criminal	law	had	grown	significantly.	In	addition	to	laws	enacted	under	









The	 effect	 of	 the	 Commonwealth’s	 growing	 legislative	 reach	 constitutes	 the	 third	 factor	
generating	 a	 perception	 of	 significant	 change:	 the	 expansion	 of	 Commonwealth	 criminal	 law	
exacerbated	 perceived	 problems	 of	 Federalism	 for	 criminal	 justice	 in	 Australia.	 By	 the	 early	
1990s,	the	growth	in	the	number	of	Commonwealth	offences	sitting	outside	the	Crimes	Act	1914	
(Cth)	was	 burgeoning.	 Although	 these	 offences	were	 regarded	 as	 part	 of	 the	 Commonwealth	
criminal	law,	as	a	result	of	sections	79	and	80	of	the	Judiciary	Act	1903	(Cth),	they	were	subject	to	
the	procedural	law	of	the	state	in	which	the	offence	was	tried.	The	existence	of	these	extra‐mural	
offences	was	 perceived	 as	 adversely	 affecting	 the	 rule	 of	 law.	 Several	 authors	 pointed	 to	 the	













politicians	 as	well	 as	MCC	drafters	 and	 commentators.	 This	 need	 for	modernisation	 revolved	







Code	Bill	 1994:	1).	Differences	between	Australian	 jurisdictions	 regarding	 the	age	of	 criminal	
responsibility	and	the	age	of	consent	were	touchstone	issues,	decried	by	the	Attorney‐General	for	
Queensland	 as	 ‘lunacy	or	 at	 best	 illogicality’	 in	 a	 country	 as	 ‘homogenous	 as	Australia’	 (Wills	
1990:	111).	In	Parliament,	reference	was	made	to	a	general	community	desire	to	unify	laws	as	far	






major,	 national	 legal	 developments,	 which	 reveal	 that	 the	 momentum	 for	 reform	 extended	
beyond	the	criminal	law.	These	developments	were	part	of	a	raft	of	economic	and	other	reforms	
aimed	 at	 market	 liberalisation	 to	 ensure	 efficiency	 and	 growth.	 The	 early	 1990s	 saw	 the	
enactment	of	‘corporations	legislation’	throughout	Australian	jurisdictions	(such	as	Corporations	
Act	2001	(Cth)).	Following	 ‘the	excesses	of	the	1980s’,	these	reforms	focused	on	responsibility	








uniform	 ‘evidence	 legislation’	 producing	 standard	 rules	 of	 evidence	 to	 be	 enacted	 into	 each	






schemas	 and	 international	 criminal	 justice	 matters—with	 the	 state	 as	 defendant—were	
beginning	to	place	pressure	on	domestic	criminal	justice	practices	(such	as	in	Dietrich	v	R	(1992)	
177	CLR	292).8	At	the	same	time,	perceptions	of	increasing	interconnectedness—typically	going	
under	 the	umbrella	 concept	of	 globalisation—were	making	 subnational	divisions	 in	 countries	
such	 as	 Australia	 less	 significant.	 In	 this	 sense,	 the	MCC	 project	 represents	 something	 of	 the	
Zeitgeist	 of	 the	 1990s:	 it	 involved	 the	 re‐inscription	 of	 boundaries—at	 a	 national	 rather	 than	
subnational	 level—and	 the	 ‘fixing’	 of	 the	 internal	 or	 domestic	 in	 the	 face	 of	 profound	
destabilising,	global	change.	‘Fixing’	such	boundaries	at	the	national	level	presented	a	stronger	









the	 criminal	 law	 (Code	 Committee	 1992:	 ii).	 Here,	 I	 show	 how	 the	 principles	 of	 criminal	






are	 ‘the	 foundations	of	 the	Commonwealth	 criminal	 law’	 (Crowley	1994:	2379).	 For	 the	Code	
Committee,	 ‘starting	 at	 the	 beginning’	 involved	 starting	 with	 the	 principles	 of	 criminal	
responsibility	 (Goode	 1997:	 269).	 Chapter	 2	 was	 the	 first	 part	 of	 the	 MCC	 to	 be	 prepared,	
borrowing	from	the	earlier	statement	on	principles	of	criminal	responsibility	drafted	by	the	Gibbs	













all	 offences	 as	 comprising	 ‘physical’	 and	 ‘fault’	 elements	 (terminology	 which	 replaced	 the	
common	law	states’	reliance	on	the	terms	actus	reus	and	mens	rea).	The	‘physical	elements’	are	
defined	 as	 conduct,	 circumstance	 or	 result	 (Model	 Criminal	Code	 s	 202).	 ‘Fault	 elements’	 are	
intention,	recklessness,	knowledge	or	negligence	(Model	Criminal	Code	s	203).	The	MCC	provides	
that	a	 fault	 element	attaches	 to	each	physical	 element	unless	 the	 legislature	 imposes	strict	or	
absolute	liability	for	that	element	(the	presumption	of	fault)	(Model	Criminal	Code	ss	204‐205).	
Chapter	2	also	defines	‘voluntariness’,	and	itemises	circumstances	in	which	there	is	no	criminal	
responsibility	 (children	 aged	 under	 10,	 children	 aged	 between	 10	 and	 14,	 and	 mental	
impairment)	 (Model	Criminal	Code	 ss	 202.2.1,	 301,	 302).	 Provisions	 relating	 to	 extensions	 of	












criminal	 responsibility	 as	 they	 applied	 in	 the	 Australian	 code	 jurisdictions.	 Reflecting	 their	
nineteenth	 century	 origins,	 the	 criminal	 codes	 of	 states	 such	 as	 Queensland	 and	 Western	





1991).	This	decision	by	 the	MCC	drafters	disappointed	 lawyers	 from	code	states:	 as	one	such	
commentator	commented,	the	MCC	opted	for	‘systematic	subjectivism’	(Colvin	1991:	85).		
	





require	proof	of	 fault,	provided	a	 template	 for	 the	elements	of	 criminal	 responsibility	 (Goode	
2002).	Third,	as	mentioned	above,	Chapter	2	also	reflected	the	recommendations	of	the	Gibbs	
Committee	 (Review	 of	 Commonwealth	 Criminal	 Law	 (Australia)	 1990),	 which	 had	 drafted	
principles	of	criminal	responsibility	that	would	not	involve	 ‘radical	reform’,	but	would	‘restate	
existing	 principles’	 and	 ‘fill	 gaps,	 remove	 obscurities	 and	 correct	 anomalies’	 (1990:	 [3.12]).	













the	 ‘special	 part’	 of	 criminal	 law)	 (Fletcher	 2000).	 Individual	 responsibility	 is	 central	 to	 the	








The	 second	way	 in	which	 the	 principles	 of	 criminal	 responsibility	were	 central	 to	 the	MCC’s	
systematising	 and	 rationalising	 effort	 concerns	 the	 orientation	 of	 principles	 of	 criminal	
responsibility	 around	 subjective	 fault.	 The	 MCC	 was	 intended	 as	 a	 definitive	 adjudication	
between	subjective	and	objective	fault	in	criminal	law—and	between	the	common	law	states’	and	
the	 code	 states’	 approaches	 to	 criminal	 responsibility—in	 favour	 of	 the	 former.	 While	 one	
common	law	commentator	labeled	the	criminal	responsibility	principles	contained	in	the	MCC	
‘conservative	 or	 traditional’	 on	 the	 basis	 that	 they	 had	 been	 articulated	 by	 academic	
commentators	 in	 the	 post‐WWII	 era	 (Leader‐Elliott	 2002:	 31),	 given	 the	 division	 between	
Australian	criminal	jurisdictions,	the	triumph	of	subjectivism	could	not	be	taken	for	granted	in	
the	Australian	context.	Following	careful	consideration,	the	MCC	drafters	embraced	the	common	





as	 a	 constraint	 on	 criminalisation:	 a	 way	 of	 establishing	 a	 limit	 on	 permissible	 state	 action.	







MCC	 was	 intended	 to	 ‘cover	 the	 field’.	 The	 other	 chapters	 of	 the	 MCC,	 which	 were	 drafted	
progressively	 throughout	 the	 1990s,	 covered	 the	 ‘core’	 or	 ‘mainstream’	 criminal	 law,	 such	 as	
sexual	 offences,	 and	 more	 peripheral	 parts	 of	 the	 corpus,	 such	 as	 conspiracy	 to	 defraud.10	
Although	 there	 were	 some	 notable	 omissions,11	 and	 while	 it	 was	 always	 intended	 that	 a	
significant	part	of	the	corpus	of	Commonwealth	criminal	law	would	continue	to	sit	outside	the	
MCC,	 the	MCC	 aimed	 to	 provide	model	 offence	 and	 defence	 provisions	 in	 the	major	 areas	 of	
substantive	criminal	law.	This	intention	to	 ‘cover	the	field’	was	an	important	dimension	of	the	
MCC	as	a	criminal	law	reform	project:	if	the	MCC	was	to	provide	the	centripetal	force	in	criminal	


















but	 also	 in	 modern	 criminal	 law.	 As	 Lacey	 argues,	 individual	 responsibility	 for	 crime	 is	 the	
lynchpin	of	 the	modern	criminal	 law	(Lacey	2001).	As	critical	 criminal	 responsibility	scholars	
suggest,	this	has	several	effects.	As	Farmer	(2016)	argues,	responsibility	(alongside	jurisdiction	
and	codification)	is	thought	to	be	central	to	the	conceptual	order	and	the	self‐understanding	of	




















replacement	 of	 diachronic	 by	 synchronic	 logic’	 (2014:	 382).	 The	 statement	 of	 principles	 of	








this	 amplifies	 the	 significance	 of	 criminal	 responsibility	 in	 the	 MCC.	 Without	 general	
interpretation	provisions—and	against	a	wider	national	background	marked	by	the	absence	of	
formally	entrenched	rights	protections	in	Australia—it	is	the	principles	of	criminal	responsibility	












codification	 unsupported	 by	 a	 thoroughly	 worked	 out	 idea	 of	 codification	 or	 general	
interpretation	 provisions—come	 together	 to	 a	 single	 point.	 The	 significance	 of	 criminal	
responsibility	 in	 the	 MCC	 is	 that	 it	 realised	 conceptual	 coherence:	 the	 general	 principles	 of	
criminal	 responsibility	 in	 the	MCC	offer	 linguistic	 uniformity;	 that	 is,	 they	provide	 a	 common	











‘even	 if	 the	various	 jurisdictions	agree	 to	disagree,	 at	 least	 they	should	be	 speaking	 the	 same	
language’.	So,	as	Goode	goes	on	to	state,	even	if	Australian	 jurisdictions	might	disagree	on	the	
basis	 for	criminal	 fault,	 the	 inclusion	of	default	 fault	elements	will	mean	they	(the	 legislature)	
have	to	say	so	(Goode	1991a:	45).	It	is	this	act	of	‘saying	so’	that	is	crucial:	disagreement	must	be	
stated.	The	ways	in	which	the	principles	of	criminal	responsibility	control	and	order	meaning	on	










the	 foundational	 nature	 of	 the	 MCC’s	 principles	 of	 criminal	 responsibility,	 and	 stated	 that	
parliament	should	not	make	a	decision	to	override	them	lightly	(Code	Committee	1992),	there	






parliament	 is	unclear	 in	 its	 intentions	regarding	new	criminal	offences	(Leader‐Elliott	2009a).	
This	means	that	the	‘fundamental’	principles	of	criminal	responsibility	are	merely	default	fault	
principles,	unable	to	exert	any	real	limiting	pressure	on	the	legislature.12	This	leads	Leader‐Elliott	
to	 conclude	 that	 Chapter	 2	 provides	 the	 legislature	with	 a	 ‘set	 of	 instructions	 for	 subverting	
common	law	principles’	of	criminal	responsibility	(Leader‐Elliott	2006:	401,	2009a:	232).	But,	
according	 to	my	analysis,	what	 is	vital	 to	appreciate	 is	 that,	 as	a	 ‘set	of	 instructions’,	 criminal	






herald	 a	 ‘new	 era’	 not	 just	 for	 Commonwealth	 law	 but	 also	 for	 the	 criminal	 law	 of	 Australia	




Code	Committee,	 the	Commonwealth	was	able	to	act	as	a	 leader	 in	criminal	 justice	which	had	
been	exclusively	a	field	of	state	power,	and	individual	states	were	left	free	to	legislate	to	adopt	
the	provisions	of	 the	MCC	as	enacted.	 In	Commonwealth	parliamentary	debates,	 the	MCC	was	
considered	 a	 ‘landmark	 in	 cooperative	 federalism’	 (Williams	 1995:	 1349),	 as	 well	 as	 a	
demonstration	 that	 Federalism	 works,	 and	 a	 ‘fitting	 project’	 with	 which	 to	 mark	 the	 then	
forthcoming	centenary	of	Australian	Federation,	 in	2001	(Crowley	1994:	2380).	 In	what,	with	
hindsight,	 seems	overly	optimistic	or	perhaps	naive,	 there	was	even	a	 suggestion	 that	 raising	
crime	to	the	national	stage	and	encasing	it	in	The	Commonwealth	Criminal	Code	would	immunise	
it	from	media	sensationalism	and	populist	concerns,	thereby	reducing	pressure	on	politicians	and	













have	been	 subject	 to	 sustained	 criticism	 (Leader‐Elliott	 2009a)	 and,	 in	 some	 instances,	 it	 has	
served	as	a	counterpoint	to	state‐based	initiatives.13	Although	it	has	been	said	that	the	success	of	




























1	 I	 thank	Umeya	Chaudhuri,	Natalie	Czapski,	Mikah	Pajaczkowska‐Russell	and	Louisa	Vaupel	 for	excellent	 research	


























9	 The	 MCC	 provisions	 on	 intoxication	 were	 based	 on	 the	 High	 Court’s	 decision	 in	 O’Connor,	 allowing	 voluntary	
intoxication	to	cast	doubt	on	whether	the	accused	had	formed	the	requisite	intent	in	relation	to	any	offence	(Code	






general	 principles	 of	 criminal	 responsibility,	 these	 reports	 covered:	 theft,	 fraud	 and	 related	 offences	 (1995);	
blackmail,	 forgery	and	bribery;	non‐fatal	offences	against	the	person	(1994);	sexual	offences	(which	also	covered	
some	evidentiary	and	procedural	 issues,	and	age	of	consent)	 (1996);	conspiracy	 to	defraud	(1997);	serious	drug	
offences	(1998);	offences	against	the	administration	of	justice;	and	public	order	offences	(1998).	
11The	Code	Committee	‘ran	out	of	time	and	resources’	on	homicide	(Goode	2004:	229).	
12This	has	been	borne	out	by	the	subsequent	development,	in	2002	and	the	years	since	then,	of	a	raft	of	Commonwealth	
terrorism	offences,	which	bear	little	connection	to	the	subjective	fault	standard	enshrined	in	the	MCC	(Bronitt	and	
Gani	2009).	
13An	example	is	the	recommendation	that	psychopathy/severe	personality	disorder	be	excluded	from	the	bounds	of	
the	mental	impairment	defence	in	NSW	(NSW	Law	Reform	Commission	2013	[3.37]‐[3.40]).		
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